On Monday, in the wake of a 1-0 away loss to Lazio this past weekend, Juventus terminated manager Igor Tudor’s contract. Allegedly, there is no immediate successor in place — they are exploring options including former Italy head coach Luciano Spalletti and Raffaele Palladino, who led Fiorentina to a sixth-place finish last season. The incoming manager will mark the sixth permanent leader in the last six years.
Juventus serves as a case study of mismanagement but also highlights how poor earlier choices influence the present and future, limiting the capacity of new leaders to make optimal decisions. Their subsequent managerial appointment will indicate whether they will further plunge into chaos or if they can begin to cleanse their organization of the accumulated toxins over the years.
Tudor faced repercussions not just for his own faults, but also those of his predecessors. This accountability extends beyond coaches; a range of figures from sports directors to CEOs share varying levels of the blame. Many players also contribute to this responsibility.
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Tudor stepped in as the interim manager in March of the previous year, taking over from Thiago Motta. (The latter was an unfortunate choice who remained in position for too long.) At that time, they were just one point shy of the Champions League spots in Serie A and his task was to guide them into the top four, which he successfully accomplished (by a single point).
During this time, the club was supposed to strategize for the 2025-26 season — however, there was no one designated to undertake this planning as Cristiano Giuntoli, the principal decision-maker, was already departing the club less than two years into a five-year contract. His successor, Damien Comolli, arrived on June 1, and with the Club World Cup approaching, he chose to retain Tudor for the subsequent season as well.
The rationale behind retaining Tudor was that there simply wasn’t adequate time — five or six weeks — to find a long-term manager before the 2025-26 season, and they preferred not to rush into a decision. In hindsight, the choice appears misguided since it is now nearly Halloween and they have only five or six days (not weeks) to secure someone.
Comolli and his recruitment team began working on summer transfers, but their flexibility was limited. A glance at Transfermarkt reveals that Juventus invested €137 million ($160m), which may seem significant until one realizes that €105.8m ($123m) was spent to convert existing loan players to permanent contracts: Chico Conceicao, Pierre Kalulu, Lloyd Kelly, Nico González (who was immediately loaned to Atletico Madrid), and Michele Di Gregorio. In many cases, Juventus was obligated to make these deals permanent, thus limiting their summer maneuvering. A classic example of the present weighed down by the errors of the past.
Nonetheless, the club secured four new signings, and here one may question how thoroughly they took Tudor’s football philosophy into account.
Wingers Eden Zhegrova and João Mário had only two league starts collectively. The other two newcomers were strikers: free agent Jonathan David (who signed a lucrative contract making him the team’s second-highest earner) and Loïs Openda. Together, they managed just six league starts and one goal. It quickly became evident that Tudor, who adhered to a strict 3-4-2-1 formation, intended to deploy only one center forward at a time; with Dusan Vlahovic remaining on the roster, the available minutes were limited. Given that this trio of strikers constitutes roughly 20% of Juventus’ wage bill, it represents poor resource management.
Tudor’s formation necessitates three central defenders, and with only five available in the squad, it is the minimum required for a team competing in the Champions League. They account for less than 12% of the wage budget despite the fact that they are three times more numerous on the field than strikers. Once again: resource management.
You can imagine Comolli expressing, «Gab, what would you like me to do? The club has incurred over half a billion Euros in losses over the last five seasons. Decisions made by my predecessors have led to these repercussions, and now I bear the burden of that.»
And surely, he’d have a point. The dual impacts of COVID-19 and myopic strategies drove the accounting practices and «buy now, pay later» schemes involved in the loan-plus-obligation arrangements that are severely constraining the club presently. The presence of Filip Kostic, Daniele Rugani, and Arek Milik (who last participated in any football activity in June 2024) still being in the squad illustrates this circumstance. (Interestingly, Arthur remains on Juventus’ roster too, although at least he is on loan elsewhere, avoiding reminders of past errors with every sighting.)
Then, there are missed opportunities. Teams frequently err regarding homegrown talent — indeed, Morgan Rogers and Cole Palmer at Manchester City, Declan Rice at Chelsea — but Juventus elevates it to an art of failure.
In the last 18 months, Juventus allowed Matìas Soulè, Dean Huijsen, Koni De Winter, Moise Kean, and Nicolo’ Fagioli depart for a total under €85m; currently, their transfer market values have increased to two-and-a-half times that. (None, except Kean, received a legitimate consistent chance with the primary team.) It seems as though vast sums were spent on their B-team — Juve Next Gen, competing in the third tier — not to enhance player development but rather to serve as a financial reservoir to exploit and plug budget deficits elsewhere.
We can discuss stability and long-term squad construction ad nauseam, but first we must acknowledge that, akin to environmental degradation, it’s often future generations who suffer from the repercussions of past errors. Juventus’ recent history is cluttered with countless missteps, leaving whoever is at the helm today with a certain degree of constraint.
This backdrop renders Juventus’ future actions particularly compelling. They have a solid foundation of young(ish) talent secured with long-term contracts to build around: Kenan Yildiz (20), David (25), Khephren Thuram (24), Conceicao (22), Andrea Cambiaso (25), Kalulu (25) — perhaps free agent Vlahovic as well, provided he can be retained at a fair price (significantly lower than his existing deal). However, it will require time to eliminate the remnants of prior poor choices, reinforcing the notion that even contemplating a 66-year-old like Spalletti (setting aside his unfortunate stint with the national team) would be unwise.
Embrace the consequences now, endure a short period of discomfort, learn from earlier misjudgments, and a brighter future awaits.
